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Himmel—Erde—Mensch: Das Verhältnis des Menschen zur Wirklichkeit in der 
 antiken chinesischen Philosophie (Heaven—Earth—Man: The relation of the human 
being to reality in ancient Chinese philosophy). By Philippe Brunozzi. Welten 
der Philosophie 8. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2011. Pp. 236. €29, 
isbn 978-3-495-48489-0.
Reviewed by Rafael Suter University of Zurich rafael.suter@aoi.uzh.ch
It is somewhat daring that Philippe Brunozzi’s Himmel—Erde—Mensch: Das Ver­
hältnis des Menschen zur Wirklichkeit in der antiken chinesischen Philosophie men-
tions in its title the triad of heaven, earth, and man, the harmonious unity of which 
has become a popular characterization in nuce of Chinese philosophy, however 
meaningless it may be. And it is apparently in an immediate attempt to outweigh this 
appeal to cliché that, already in the subtitle, the author specifies that it is the human 
being on whom his book concentrates. Indeed, Brunozzi probes if not a cliché then 
a view on classical Chinese philosophy that has become rather commonplace: What 
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is the textual basis of the widespread conviction that ancient Chinese thought is 
mainly interested in practical matters of everyday life? It is this preconception that 
Brunozzi intends to evaluate in a close reading of three classical Chinese works: the 
Analects, the Mozi, and the Laozi.
Brunozzi’s book is a revised version of his Ph.D. thesis, consisting of three parts. 
The first is dedicated to challenging the above-mentioned preconception of Chinese 
philosophy and to the question of what I tentatively translate as the “actualization of 
man’s relation to reality” (Ein problematisches Grundverständnis und die Frage nach 
dem Vollzug des menschlichen Wirklichkeitsverhältnisses) (pp. 17–48). Part 2, by far 
the largest, promises to test, in a close reading of the selected texts, the questionable 
premises presented in part 1 (“Die Überprüfung,” pp. 49–209). The third part offers a 
summarizing assessment (“Die Auswertung,” pp. 215–222).
The view of Chinese philosophy that Brunozzi puts to the test is the one  advanced 
by interpretations such as those by Roger T. Ames or François Jullien. Brunozzi de-
serves credit for attempting, against fashionable trends, a philosophical reading of 
the mentioned works as texts. To this end, he employs Ricoeur’s hermeneutical ap-
proach and his concept of the “world of the text,” thus elegantly circumventing 
 delicate issues of authorship and textual genesis. Another valuable contribution of 
Brunozzi’s work is his innovative and sometimes highly appealing translations of 
the primary sources. Clearly tailored to the author’s conceptual investigations, they 
nonetheless remain sufficiently faithful to the Chinese original. If there is a motif 
pervading the score of Brunozzi’s work, it is his emphasis on the central role of the 
lived body (Leib) for reconstructing the relation of man to his environment in the 
works he analyzes.
Despite all the originality of Brunozzi’s approach, there are problems with the 
study, some of which are perhaps due precisely to the approach. For one thing, the 
overall argumentative structure of Brunozzi’s study could be more convincing. Given 
that it is explicitly designed to test the widespread view that ancient Chinese phi-
losophy is focused on issues of practical life, it is astonishing that in his analyses the 
author at times readily endorses the validity of this claim himself. If Brunozzi is con-
vinced that this view is correct in case a detailed investigation of the sources yields 
a more multifaceted picture of the human way of interacting with the environment 
(p. 217), he is probably too optimistic. If one sets out to test this view, why not try to 
read certain passages explicitly against it? To be fair, Brunozzi readily admits the 
limited scope of his own approach: “If Chinese philosophy was truly interested in 
concerns of the human relation to reality, one has to ask why the recommended ap-
proaches were not more explicitly and more systematically presented” (p. 221). He 
remains vague, however, when he proposes that complementing our “one-sided” 
philological approach to the texts by “overall practically oriented forms and ways of 
text interpretation” could lead to additional precision (p. 224). Further problems 
concern more specific points in Brunozzi’s close readings of the Chinese sources, 
some of which I mention in the following chapter-by-chapter discussion.
The first chapter presents a reading of the Analects. Brunozzi admits that philo-
logical uncertainties make it impossible to determine either its authorship or its 
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 precise date of composition. Nonetheless he is convinced that the philological im-
ponderables do not imply that the text falls to incoherent pieces, but that, due to 
the overall topical and stylistic consistency, there is a certain degree of coherence in 
content. Brunozzi reconstructs the Analects’ conception of reality via the concept 
of “heaven” (tian) (p. 53). For him, reality is here restricted to the actual course of 
things, with no “ontological spindle” hidden behind the concrete spectacle of reality. 
Heaven being no transcendent authority (p. 59), reality is conceived as “an imma-
nent, self-active, relational process” (p. 61). While, for Brunozzi, the Analects lack 
any abstract or definite conception of what “the human being” is, he tries to show 
that what the text does say about the human being pertains to the process of “actual-
izing and moulding himself or herself” within the concrete environment (p. 63).
A considerable part of this chapter is dedicated to the li, “etiquette/rites.” Brun-
ozzi notes a tension between the Analects’ emphasis on these traditional modes 
of behavior and his own reconstruction focusing on the “situational, bodily, and 
 co-creative” experience of reality. He points to the “external character” of the li to 
reconcile this apparent opposition. On the basis of Analects 3.9, he notes that the 
rites come to the fore only insofar as they are enacted by concrete individuals. For 
him, this is evidence that they are no abstract entities. They are real exclusively 
as  expressions of lived and actualized behavior, that is, in what Brunozzi terms their 
“outward” manifestation (p. 82). Hence, the li cannot be regarded as ideal rules 
of human interaction (p. 84). On the basis of the Master’s biography in the Ana­
lects, Brunozzi eventually claims that it is by unveiling a way of “undistorted self-
realization” (unverzerrter Selbstvollzug) that the Analects guide the human being 
toward a truly successful life (p. 103).
The second chapter is dedicated to the core chapters of the Mozi. Again, Brun-
ozzi’s investigation starts from the notion of heaven (p. 123). Just as in the Analects, 
heaven is said not to refer to a transcendent entity with which people could interact. 
However, when, in an informative footnote, Brunozzi interprets the Mohist emphasis 
on the role of heaven as a reaction against the increasing doubts on heaven’s reli-
ability to guarantee the proper course of human and natural affairs, one wonders if 
this might not be indicative that Mohists possibly expected more from heaven than 
Brunozzi is ready to admit. He argues that Mohists regarded the actuality of the pro-
cess (aktuell sich vollziehendes Wirklichkeitsgeschehen) as the lived embodiment of 
heaven. Based on the “Fayi” chapter, he further identifies heaven with the tendency 
of the coherent whole of this process. The notions of “heavenly intention” (tianzhi) 
and “heaven” itself thus largely coincide. Still, for Brunozzi, this kind of “intention-
ality,” manifest in the course of things, does not involve a conception of heaven as an 
independent, volitional entity.
Brunozzi argues that the Mohists characterize human beings by their essential 
dependence (p. 132), at the same time according to them an active part, a “sup-
portive function,” for the course of their concrete environment. Brunozzi regards 
participating in relationships of mutual support (p. 134) as the core of the Mohist 
 human condition, thus admitting the possibility of human failure: any arbitrary em-
phasis on one of the various relationships to one’s environment can harm the overall 
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balance and lead to devastating consequences. Human participation in various 
 relationships of mutual support is no less than a duty (Aufgabe) assigned to effectu­
ate (Wirksammachen) them to the environment (pp. 136–137). For Brunozzi, at the 
heart of “devastating disasters, severe calamities, and horrible famines” (p. 133, 
quoting the Mozi) is the human failure to live up to this duty. But is the idea of a 
 human influence via heaven on the course of the seasons, on the growth of plants 
and animals, and even on natural disasters not just as plausibly an expression of 
an age-old religious or magical conception of reality, as it might be supportive of 
Brunozzi’s reading?
The Mohist notion of “standard” (fa) he conceptualizes as a means “mediating” 
between the individual human being and his immediate envi ronment on the one 
hand, and between him and the shared experience of humankind on the other. For 
Brunozzi, Mohist “standards” are tools that can only be “situationally” effectuated, 
rather than abstract ideals (p. 153). Later, when Brunozzi discusses the Mohist notion 
of “distinction” (bian), he emphasizes that the stock examples here are terms for 
 colors and flavors, just to appeal, again, to the “bodily awareness” of these percep-
tions. Yet, at least in the case of “black” and “white,” what he readily interprets in 
terms of his own emphasis on the lived body might just as well simply allude to what, 
in case of the blind man, strikes one as an obvious example of someone capable of 
using the words without knowing what they refer to. Do we really know enough 
about the way perception was conceptualized in ancient China in order to say with 
any degree of certainty that Brunozzi’s emphasis on the lived body informed by 
 Bernhard Waldenfels, Gernot Böhme, Rolf Elberfeld, and Mathias Obert, among 
 others, is not at least as alien to the Mohists as, say, syllogistics?
The third chapter concentrates on the Laozi. When, in his discussion of the text’s 
philological intricacies, Brunozzi remarks that it may have resulted “from a process 
of writing down aphorisms of various age and origin that had been passed down 
orally” (p. 167), he foreshadows the enormous difficulties any philosophical reading 
has to face. Brunozzi first discusses the term dao, translating it as “original moved-
ness” (ursprüngliche Bewegtheit) or simply “movement” (Bewegung). As he had set 
out to question whether Ames’ and Jullien’s interpretations of early Chinese thought 
are actually supported by textual evidence, it is somewhat surprising that, at this 
point, he almost exclusively relies on their interpretation of dao. He starts his discus-
sion by stating that “in spite of its permanence and independence . . . this pervading 
movedness does not point towards a timeless, eternal Being regulating the particular 
movements from either inside or outside” (p. 170). However, Brunozzi does not at-
tempt to further substantiate this sweeping claim. That a “metaphysical” interpreta-
tion of dao is inappropriate may be correct. Still, as it so strikingly fits the view of 
those whose preconception of Chinese thought Brunozzi promises to evaluate, one 
would expect him to dig somewhat deeper here.
Brunozzi’s discussion on the genealogy of the Way in terms of an all-encompass-
ing movedness, his interpretation of particular movements as inheriting the “spin” of 
the previous ones, is very illuminating in itself, and it certainly gestures toward one 
of the important reference points of the speculations in the Laozi: the continuity of 
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genealogical reproduction. Still, is it not one of the striking insights of this text that 
the dao as the first ancestor cannot be understood in a simple analogy to reproduc-
tion? Unlike any line of natural reproduction, this one has no beginning and no end 
in time. Is this not exactly the point, one would like to ask, where the Way is more 
than the entirety of this regenerative process, where indeed it is something “abso-
lutely different”? Brunozzi underlines that “the human being does not have any par-
ticular status” (p. 185) in the Laozi, and for him the essential point of being human 
here lies in a human being’s “self-continuation” (Selbstfortführung). As Brunozzi sees 
it, the aberration of man according to the Laozi is caused by his fixation “on definite 
goals and values” that have him “lose sight of the actual context and the exigencies 
required by particular situations” (p. 187).
These rather general and abstract statements are then referred to the example of 
the infant in Laozi chapter 55. Unconsciously interacting with his environment, the 
nursling succeeds in gaining the care and affection of all surrounding beings. This 
picture is interpreted by Brunozzi as “bodily spontaneity” (leibhaftige Spontaneität) 
(p. 191). For Brunozzi, the lived body is here viewed in its original and immediate 
naturalness, and man is characterized by his ability spontaneously to meet with par-
ticular situations (situatives Einfinden) (p. 192). While this emphasis on the lived 
body may be intuitively plausible in the case of the infant, it appears less so if Brun-
ozzi proceeds to the ruler. What is implicitly there in the picture of the infant winning 
over his entire environment is made explicit here: a sense of dominance. Yet, while 
one readily accepts the idea that the baby enchants his immediate environment en-
tirely unconsciously, this is less plausible in case of the ruler. And even if the relevant 
passage of the Laozi seriously suggests to the ruler to stultify himself in order to adapt 
his own power to the baby’s unconscious charm, such a suggestion is ultimately 
proposed to a ruler as a means of domination. Is the relation of dominance not at 
least of the same relevance to this passage as the fact that the baby’s interaction with 
the environment is a kind of “bodily spontaneity”? This indicates a more general fault 
of omission of the present study of the Laozi. Given that the oldest extant commen-
tary is found in the Hanfeizi, a text arguably less interested in the realization of hu-
man individuals than in the unconditional submission of his subjects to an omnipotent 
ruler, and in view of the fact that “to rule” is one of the basic meanings of the word 
dao, one wonders why the entire dimension of rulership is virtually absent from this 
study. Approaching the topic of “naturalness” in this context would plausibly have 
led the author to say more about the political and ideological dimension of the Laozi, 
from which he keeps away so carefully.
Among recent publications on ancient Chinese philosophy, Brunozzi’s study 
stands out by its highly original approach. Deliberately renouncing the drawing of 
rash and ready comparisons, he develops his insights in detailed reflections on his 
sources without losing track in a maze of philological leg work. In this sense, Brun-
ozzi’s innovative phenomenological approach doubtlessly enriches the field. At the 
same time, it brings along its own difficulties and raises a number of problems that 
deserve further scrutiny. One of the obvious difficulties is the central notion of the 
“lived body”: What is the relationship between the historical and hence merely con-
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tingent circumstances of its emergence and the apparently universal immediacy of 
bodily experience that it purports? Clearly, the question to what extent it can add to 
our understanding of ancient Chinese sources not least hinges on this. Irrespective 
of this, Brunozzi’s study offers valuable and inspiring insights into the texts he inves-
tigates. Not least of all, Brunozzi’s careful and multifaceted language also makes this 
book an enjoyable read.
Errata: On page 202, the spelling should be “Su Che” instead of “Su Zhe.” The 
Chinese is usually given in traditional characters, but at times some simplified char-
acters slip in (e.g., on p. 117).
De la continuité dynamique dans l’univers confucéen: Lecture néoconfucéenne 
du Zhongyong (中庸): Nouvelle traduction du chinois classique et commentaire her­
méneutique (Of dynamic continuity in the Confucian universe: A Neo-Confucian 
reading of the Zhongyong: A new translation from the classical Chinese and a 
 hermeneutical commentary). By Diana Arghiresco. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2013. 
Pp. 416. €35, isbn 978-2-204-10026-7.
 Reviewed by Christian Soffel
 University of Trier
 soffel@uni-trier.de
When delving into traditional Chinese philosophy, it is tempting to search for an 
“original meaning” of the classical scriptures. However, this is a futile task for several 
reasons: First, we are confronted with a complex textual history, lacking a reliable 
“Urtext” version; much less can we rely on sufficient contextual information. Sec-
ond, modern recipients—consciously or unconsciously—are prone to be influenced 
by orthodox interpretations, which have been dominating the discourse for several 
centuries. A good way to solve this dilemma is to take a close look at the most 
 prevalent standard commentaries from the middle and late imperial era. This way 
we can not only increase our awareness for developments of the classical tradi-
tion, but also unlock its full epistemological potential for contemporary philosophi-
cal discussion.
In view of its reliable textual foundation and its prominent position in the living 
tradition in East Asia, it is striking that scholars have been hesitating so far to fully 
translate Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 commentary to the Four Books (Daxue 大學, Zhongyong 
中­庸, Lunyu 論語, and Mengzi 孟子), the basic compendium of Confucian learning, 
which has served as the standard for elementary education and civil service exami-
nations since the fourteenth century. In spite of their special importance, Western 
scholars interested in the Four Books’ wisdom have concentrated on the classical 
texts and used Zhu Xi’s extensive notes mostly as a stepping stone in order to  uncover 
the “original meaning” of the canon. The new book by Diana Arghiresco, De la con­
tinuité dynamique dans l’univers confucéen: Lecture néoconfucéenne du Zhongyong, 
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